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Ancillary Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs Claim
Against a Non-Diverse Third-Party Defendant:
Kroger v. Owen Equipment & Erection Company
In Kroger v. Owen Equipment & Erection Company' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to follow "the
great numerical majority of cases" 2 and held that no independent
jurisdictional grounds are required for a federal district court to decide
a plaintiffs state law claim against a non-diverse third-party defen-
dant. The plaintiff in Kroger initially gained access to the federal
court for resolution of her state law claim under a jurisdictional
statute3 that requires complete diversity of citizenship between all
plaintiffs and defendants. 4  Plaintiff was a resident of Iowa and de-
fendant was a Nebraska corporation. Defendant, as a third-party
plaintiff, impleaded a third-party defendant pursuant to rule 14(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and plaintiff amended her
complaint to assert a claim against the third-party defendant. Plaintiff
was misled by the impleaded third party's answer into believing that
the third party was not a resident of Iowa, plaintiffs state. Near
the end of the trial, however, the third-party defendant revealed that
it was a resident of plaintiffs state and moved for the trial court to
dismiss plaintiffs claim against it for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
The trial court rejected the motion for dismissal, and the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that "[o]nce the
court has before it all of the parties to the controversy, sharing com-
mon and interrelated facts, it has power in the jurisdictional sense to
dispose of the case."'
The Eighth Circuit in Kroger thus became the first court of ap-
peals to hold that the federal courts have ancillary jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant. Prior to
Kroger, the Courts of Appeals of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits had refused to hear a plaintiff's claim against a third-party
defendant without independent jurisdictional grounds. 6 The United
1. 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 715 (1978).
2. Id. at 422.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
4. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
5. 558 F.2d at 424.
6. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533
F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977); Rosario v. American Export-
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1977); Parker
v. W.W. Moore & Sons, 528 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co.,
512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972); McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960). However,
in Saalfrank, Rosario, and Parker, the issue was not firmly resolved. The courts indicated that
even if the general rule was that no independent grounds of jurisdiction were required, juris-
diction would have been denied as a matter of discretion.
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States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Kroger to resolve this
conflict.
7
This Case Comment will provide background material concerning
the concept of ancillary jurisdiction in order to facilitate a proper under-
standing of the Kroger case. Kroger will also be analyzed in light of
the United States Supreme Court's most recent discussion of ancillary
jurisdiction in Aldinger v. Howard' to show that the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Kroger is not inconsistent with that decision. Finally, the
reasons upon which courts have relied in the past in denying ancillary
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against third-party defendants will
be analyzed. The inconsistencies inherent in the reasoning of those
courts support the argument that the Kroger decision was well reasoned
and should be affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
I. THE CONCEPT OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
Article III of the United States Constitution confers jurisdiction
upon the federal courts and limits this federal judicial power to the
cases and controversies enumerated therein.9 Ancillary jurisdiction is
a judicially developed concept based on the premise that a federal
court has the jurisdictional power to resolve all disputes involved in
an article III case or controversy, including matters over which the
court would not have jurisdiction were they independently presented.
Thus, when a district court has valid federal question or diversity
jurisdiction over a principal action and ancillary jurisdiction is found
to exist, the court is empowered to resolve state law disputes that
are related to the primary claim, regardless of the citizenship of the
parties, the amount in controversy, or any other federal jurisdictional
requirement. ' °
Ancillary jurisdiction becomes an issue when additional parties
are impleaded pursuant to rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." Rule 14(a) provides: "At any time after commencement
7. 98 S. Ct. 715 (1978).
8. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
9. Article III, section 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a party; -to Controversies between two or more States;
-between a State and Citizens of another State; -between Citizens of different States;
-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
10. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 21 (3d ed. 1976).
11. Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure present additional possibilities for the ex-
ercise of ancillary jurisdiction. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CoOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3523, at 66-70 (1975) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIOnT, A. MILLER,
& E. COOPER]. It has been held that federal courts have ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory
counterclaims under rule 13(a), see, e.g., Pipeliners Local Union No. 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d
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of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a
summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him., 12  The third-party defendant can then assert any
claim arising out of the same transaction that he has against either
the plaintiff or the defendant, and the plaintiff can assert any claim
arising out of the same transaction that he has against the third-party
defendant. 13 Rule 14(a), however, does not indicate whether inde-
pendent jurisdictional grounds are required for these claims.14  Thus,
the courts have been forced to determine whether third-party claims
raised under rule 14(a) can properly be decided by a federal court
when no independent jurisdictional grounds for the claims are present.
The issue has arisen in three situations.
A. Defendant's claim against third-party defendant
The courts uniformly hold that no independent grounds of juris-
diction are required for the defendant to implead a third-party under
rule 14(a).15 Thus, if the plaintiff's claim is properly before the court
the defendant may implead anyone not a party to the action who may
be liable to him, even if the claim is based on state law, no diversity
of citizenship exists between the parties, and the amount in contro-
versy requirement is not met. The justification for this rule is that,
because the defendant has been brought involuntarily into a federal
forum, he should be allowed to resolve in that court all disputes related
to the plaintiff's claim against him. 6
1193 (10th Cir. 1974), and over additional parties joined thereto under rule 13(h), see, e.g.,
H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1967). On the other hand, permissive
counterclaims under rule 13(b), see, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976), and additional parties thereto, see, e.g., Non-Ferrous Metals Inc.
v. Saramar Aluminum Co., 25 F.R.D. 102 (N.D. Ohio 1960), require independent jurisdictional
grounds. Ancillary jurisdiction has been recognized in interpleader proceedings under rule 22.
See, e.g., Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955). Intervention as of right under
rule 24(a) has also been held to come within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts.
See, e.g., Lenz v. Wagner, 240 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1957). However, no ancillary jurisdiction has
generally been held to exist over permissive intervention under rule 24(b). See, e.g., Houghen
v. Merkel, 47 F.R.D. 528 (D. Minn. 1969).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
13. Id.
14. It is clear, however, that rule 14(a) itself does not extend the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts . .. .
15. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d
143 (6th Cir. 1969); H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1967); Stemler
v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1965); Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3rd Cir. 1962); Dery v. Wyer, 265
F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
16. See, e.g., Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715
(5th Cir. 1970).
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B. Third-party defendant's claim against plaintiff
Although some courts in the past have required independent juris-
dictional grounds for a third-party defendant's claim against the
plaintiff,'7 the overwhelming majority of courts today do not. 8 Again,
the justification is that the impleaded third party is brought involun-
tarily into the federal court and should be given the opportunity to
have all issues related to the plaintiff's claim adjudicated in one
forum. 19
C. Plaintiff's claim against third-party defendant
Although some district courts have held that independent juris-
dictional grounds are not required, 20 every court of appeals before
Kroger that decided the issue refused to allow the plaintiff to maintain
a claim against the third-party defendant without independent juris-
dictional grounds. 2' Several commentators, however, have argued
that the courts should allow a plaintiff to maintain a claim against a
non-diverse third-party defendant.22  The Kroger court was the first
court at the appellate level to do so.
II. THE Kroger CASE
A. The Facts
The plaintiff, Geraldine Kroger, brought a wrongful death action
against the Omaha Public Power District for the death of her husband,
17. See, e.g., James King & Son, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Shverha v. Maryland Gas Co., 110 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 195.,).
18. See, e.g., Mayer Paving and Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. and Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486 (D. Neb. 1965); Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank and
Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
19. See, e.g., Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. anId Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709,
715 (5th Cir. 1970).
20. See, e.g., Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D. Kan, 1975); CCF
Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Spearing v.
Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Davis v. United States, 350
F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp, 265 (W.D. Pa.
1968); Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D. Neb. 1965). But see Mickelic v. United States
Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Joseph v. Chr)sler Corp., 61 F.R.D. 347
(W.D. Pa. 1973); Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Ayoub
v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Palumbo v. Western Md. Ry., 271 F.
Supp. 361 (D. Md. 1967).
21. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533
F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977); Rosario v. American Export-
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 42) U.S. 857 (1977); Parker v.
W.W. Moore & Sons, 528 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co,,
512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972); McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960).
22. See 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.27, at 14-565 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE'S]; Baker, Toward A Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,
33 U. PITT. L. REv. 759 (1972); Note, Rule 14(a) and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Plaintiffls Clahn
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a workman who was electrocuted when the boom of a crane came in
contact with electric power lines. 3 Omaha Public Power District
impleaded Owen Equipment & Erection Company [hereinafter referred
to as Owen] as a third-party defendant. 24
The district court had diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff, an Iowa
citizen, and defendant, a Nebraska corporation?25 Because Owen was
incorporated in the state of Nebraska, plaintiff had reason to believe
that diversity existed between her and Owen, the third-party de-
fendant. 6 Kroger therefore amended her complaint to state a claim
against Owen. 7 In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that
Owen was "a Nebraska corporation with its principal place of business
in Nebraska."28  Owen's principal place of business was actually in
Iowa, but in its answer Owen did not deny outright that its principal
place of business was in Nebraska. Instead it used a qualified general
denial; it admitted that Owen was a "corporation organized and ex-
isting under the Laws of the State of Nebraska" and "denied each
and every other allegation contained in said Amended Complaint.'"
This use of a qualified general denial misled plaintiff into believ-
ing that Owen was a resident of Nebraska only and thus was in viola-
tion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b), which provides: "When
a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification
of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material
and deny only the remainder." 0 In other words, if a party intends
to admit only part of an averment, he should not attempt to controvert
the remainder by a general denial at the end of his answer, but should
make a special denial so that the plaintiff knows exactly what is being
admitted and what is being denied.3' To comply with this rule,
Owen should have admitted that it was a Nebraska corporation but
specifically denied that its principal place of business was in Nebraska.
Against Non-Diverse Third-Party Defendant, 33 WASH. & LEE L REV. 796 (1976); Note, Rule
14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REv. 265 (1971).
23. Plaintiff also joined another defendant, Paxton & Vierling Steel Company, which
was later dismissed because of a jurisdictional defect. 558 F.2d at 429.
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
26. A corporation is deemed to be a resident of both its state of incorporation and its
principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
28. 558 F.2d at 419.
29. Id.
30. FED. R. Crv. P. 8(b).
31. See Kirby v. Turner-Day & Woolworth Handle Co., 50 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Tenn.
1943); 2A MooRE's, supra note 22, 8.23 at 1828 (1975); 5 C. WRIGHlT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1266, at 284 (1969) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT & A. MILLEtJ
The Eighth Circuit, however, did not rely upon Owen's procedural violation in reaching its
decision. The court held that there was jurisdictional power to hear plaintiff's claim against
the third-party defendant, not that the third-party defendant's procedural violation prevented it
from challenging the jurisdiction of the court. See text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Omaha Public Power District moved for summary judgment
against the plaintiff. Summary judgment was granted, and Omaha
Public Power District was dismissed from the action. Shortly there-
after, Owen's motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff was
denied, and the case went to trial with Kroger and Owen being the
only parties to the action.32
Near the end of the trial, Owen's secretary testified that the
corporation's principal place of business was in Iowa, not Nebraska.
Later that same afternoon, Owen challenged the jurisdiction of the
court, stating that there was no diversity of citizenship between the
parties. The court was convinced that Owen had intentionally with-
held its jurisdictional challenge until the end of the trial and that Owen
had purposely concealed the fact that its principal place of business
was in Iowa.3 3  The district court rejected the challenge to its jurisdic-
tion, holding that it had discretion under United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs 4 to exercise its judicial power over Kroger's claim against
Owen. 35  The trial was completed and the plaintiff was awarded a
jury verdict of $234,756.36 Defendant appealed, challenging the juris-
diction of the federal district court.
B. The Holding
The issue before the court of appeals was whether independent
jurisdictional grounds were required to maintain plaintiff's state law
claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant. The court began its
analysis with a discussion of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs." In that
case, the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts have
the jurisdictional power to hear a state claim arising out of the same
facts as a federal claim between two parties already properly before
the court."8  Prior to Gibbs, the test, as established in Hurn v. Oursler,
9
had been that a state claim was within the pendent jurisdiction of a
federal court if "two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of
action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question
• . . [but not] where two separate and distinct causes of action are
alleged, one only of which is federal in character.' 40 The Supreme
Court in Gibbs discarded the Hum test and held that jurisdictional
32. 558 F.2d at 429.
33. Id. at 419.
34. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
35. 558 F.2d at 419.
36. Id. at 418.
37. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
38. Id. at 725. The plaintiff in Gibbs brought suit in a federal district court alleging a
violation of § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970), and joined a
state claim for malicious interference with contract rights.
39. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
40. Id. at 246.
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power exists whenever the state and federal claims "derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact,"'4 so that if "considered without
regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding." 42  Gibbs established a power/discretion test of jurisdic-
tion: if federal and state claims arise out of the same "nucleus of
operative fact," the court has power in a jurisdictional sense to hear
the state claim but must still decide whether it should hear the state
claim as a matter of discretion.43 Some factors that the Supreme
Court considered relevant in exercising this discretion were "judicial
economy" and "fairness and convenience to the litigants.""
The Kroger court based its decision upon Gibbs although the
jurisdictional issues presented by Gibbs and Kroger were not identical.
Pendent jurisdiction is the term used to describe the situation pre-
sented by Gibbs, in which the plaintiff sought to join a state claim
with a federal claim against a particular defendant.45 Kroger dealt
with ancillary jurisdiction and differed from Gibbs because it was
concerned not with an additional claim between two parties, but with
an additional party impleaded in the action pursuant to rule 14(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The difference between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction has not
been clearly articulated by the courts. Both doctrines deal with the
question whether article III of the Constitution confers upon the
federal courts jurisdiction over an entire case or controversy, including
state claims over which a federal court would not have jurisdiction
if they were independently presented. The best way to distinguish
between the doctrines may be to describe rather than to define them.
The term pendent jurisdiction is used to describe only the power of a
federal court to adjudicate both federal and state claims that a plaintiff
has against a particular defendant.46 Ancillary jurisdiction, on the
other hand, is a broader concept encompassing all other situations
in which federal jurisdiction is exercised over a state claim closely
related to a claim that is properly before a district court.47  Thus,
ancillary jurisdiction is the term used to describe the power a district
court may have over state law counterclaims and cross-claims under
rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, third-party proceed-
41. 383 U.S. at 725.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 725-26.
44. Id. at 726.
45. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 31, § 1588, at 807 (1971).
46. When the defendant has a state law claim against the plaintiff, i.e., a counterclaim,
the court's power to hear the claim is described as ancillary jurisdiction. See 13 C. WRIGHTr,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 11, § 3523, at 66.
47. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. Mi.uER & E. COOPER, supra note 11, § 3523, at 66-70.
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ings under rule 14, interpleader proceedings under rule 22, and
intervention under rule 24.48
The court in Kroger was faced with the question whether the
Gibbs rationale should be limited to cases raising the issue of pendent
jurisdiction or whether it should also be applied to delineate the
scope of the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Supreme
Court's reasoning in Gibbs did not appear to be limited to the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine but rather stated that jurisdictional power exists
whenever multiple claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative
facts. 49  Furthermore, in Aldinger v. Howard5  the United States
Supreme Court questioned the utility of distinguishing between
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction:
Given the complexities of the many manifestations of federal jurisdiction,
together with the countless factual permutations possible under the
Federal Rules, there is little profit in attempting to decide, for example,
whether there are any "principled" differences between pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction; or, if there are, what effect Gibbs had on such dif-
ferences.5
In discussing whether the Gibbs rationale should be applied to the
jurisdictional question in Kroger, the court of appeals quoted Professor
Moore's interpretation of Gibbs:
Properly read, United Mine Workers reemphasizes the fundamental
principle that a federal court has jurisdictional power to adjudicate the
whole case, i.e., all claims, state or federal, which derive from a common
nucleus of operative facts ...
* , * United Mine Workers can authorize an independent relaxation
of the rule against ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff's amended claims
against the third-party defendant.52
The court of appeals concluded that the solution to the issue presented
in Kroger was clearly outlined by the power/ discretion test of Gibbs.""
1. The Question of Power
The Eighth Circuit gave two justifications for determining that
Kroger fell within the framework of the Gibbs test of jurisdictional
power. First, Kroger's claim against Owen arose out of the core of
"operative facts" giving rise to both the plaintiff's claims against the
defendant and the defendant's claim against the third-party de-
fendant.14  Second, the court pointed out that, because independent
48. Id.
49. 383 U.S. at 725.
50. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
51. Id. at 13.
52. 3 MooRE's, supra note 22, 14.27, at 14-569-70 (footnotes omitted),
53. 558 F.2d at 424.
54. Id.
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jurisdictional grounds are not generally required for a defendant's
claim against a third-party defendant or the latter's claim against the
plaintiff, courts frequently adjudicate ancillary claims having no
independent jurisdictional basis. 55 Because "[a]ll parties were before
the court . . . it is both paradoxical and anomalous to hold in this.
situation that, although Kroger can go against [Omaha Public Power
District] which can go against Owen and Owen may proceed against
Kroger, Kroger cannot proceed against Owen."
5 6
2. The Exercise of Discretion
Once the issue of judicial power was resolved, the court of ap-
peals found no abuse of the lower court's discretion in deciding to
exercise that power.57 The Gibbs discretionary factors of "judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants '58 were clearly
present in Kroger. The proceeding in the case had already lasted for
over three years, and judicial economy and convenience to the litigants
would certainly not be served by requiring the action to be relitigated
in state court.59  As to the matter of fairness, the court stated: "By
subtle and adroit pleading the defendant has gained a substantial
advantage. If the trial goes well, it can keep the jurisdictional point
hidden. If the trial seems to be going badly or, indeed, if it loses on
the merits, . . .it can even then challenge jurisdiction . . .1160
The facts of Kroger presented the Eighth Circuit with an addi-
tional issue concerning the district court's exercise of discretion.
Owen contended that the dismissal from the action of Omaha Public
Power District, whose place of residence had originally conferred
diversity jurisdiction on the court, limited the district court's discretion
to retain ancillary jurisdiction. 61 The court of appeals stated that the
dismissal of the original claim was a factor that should be considered
by the court in deciding whether to hear the case as a matter of dis-
cretion.62 But "if there has been a substantial commitment of the
court's or litigant's resources prior to the termination of the main
claim, dismissal of the rule 14 claim [would] run counter to the ra-
tionale justifying ancillary jurisdiction and third-party practice.'63
55. Id. at 422.
56. Id. at 424.
57. Id. at 425-27.
58. 383 U.S. at 726.
59. The court stated: "The satisfaction here of the first two factors requires no exegesis."
558 F.2d at 425.
60. Id. at 427.
61. Id. at 426.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 426 n.36 (quoting 6 C. WtIrr & A. MiLLER, supra note 31, § 1444, at 234-37
(1971)). Other courts almost unanimously agree that ancillary jurisdiction survives even after
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The court went on to state that whether or not the district court abused
its discretion in its retention of the case, Owen's conduct in misleading
the plaintiff as to its principal place of business estopped it from as-
serting abuse of discretion under the most elementary consideration
.of judicial fairness. 64
III. THE EFFECT OF Aldinger v. Howard
The United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to define
the limits of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction."5 In Aldinger v.
Howard,66 the Court's most recent discussion of -these doctrines, the
factual situation and legal issues were clearly distinguishable from
Kroger. Since Aldinger did tend to narrow the doctrines of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction, however, and because the dissent in Kroger
argued that it was dispositive of that case,67 an analysis of the possible
effect of Aldinger is appropriate here.68
In Aldinger, the plaintiff, after having been discharged by the
county treasurer from her job in his office, 69 brought suit against the
treasurer and other county officers in a federal district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.70 The plaintiff claimed that her discharge violated her
federal constitutional rights, and jurisdiction over the federal claim
was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).71 The county was not a party
the main claim has been settled. See, e.g., United States v. United Pac, Ins. Co,. 472 F,2d 792
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
64. 558 F.2d at 427. It should be noted that the court did not hold that the third-party
defendant's conduct would prevent it from challenging the jurisdictional powver of the district
court; rather, the court stated that the third-party defendant's wrongdoing estopped it from
asserting that the court abused its discretion in retaining jurisdiction,
65. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (19'3). in which the Supreme
Court stated:
Whether there exists judicial power to hear the state law claims against the County is,
in short, a subtle and complex question with far-reaching implic,,tions. But we do not
consider it appropriate to resolve this difficult issue in the present case, for we have
concluded that even assuming, arguendo, the existence of power to hear the claim,
the District Court, in exercise of its legitimate discretion, properly declined to join the
claims against the County in these suits.
Id. at 715.
66. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
67. 558 F.2d at 430 (Bright, J., dissenting).
68. For further discussions of this case, see Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1977); Comment, Supreme Court Says No to Pendent
Parties-At Least This Time, 38 U. PrTr. L. REV. 395 (1976).
69. The plaintiff was informed by the county treasurer that "although her job per-
formance was 'excellent,' she would be dismissed, effective two weeks hence, because she was
allegedly living with [her] boy friend." 427 U.S. at 3.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula:ion, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)(1970) provides in relevant part:
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to the action. The plaintiff, however, sought to join with this federal
claim a state claim against the county on a theory of vicarious liability
arising out of the tortious conduct of the county officials.72  The Su-
preme Court held that the district court did not have the judicial
power to hear the claim against the county.
73
Aldinger is distinguishable from Kroger in two important ways.
First, in Kroger the plaintiff sought to assert a claim against a party
that was already properly before the court;74 whereas in Aldinger,
the plaintiff sought to bring in an entirely new party.7" The reasoning
of Aldinger suggested that this difference could be determinative.
Although declining to make any "sweeping pronouncement upon the
existence of ancillary jurisdiction," the Court in Aldinger observed that
"[i]f the new party sought to be impleaded is not otherwise subject
to federal jurisdiction, there is a more serious obstacle to the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction than if the parties already before the court are
required to litigate a state law claim." '76 Aldinger is also distinguish-
able simply on the ground that it is a section 1983 case. The Court
had already decided in Moor v. County of Alameda77 that Congress,
in enacting section 1983, had intended to exclude counties from the
definition of "persons" upon whom liability could be imposed under
section 1983.78 Thus, granting ancillary jurisdiction in Aldinger would
have allowed the plaintiff to circumvent the congressional exclusion
in section 1983. The Court's holding was very narrow: "[W]e decide
here only the issue of so-called 'pendent party' jurisdiction with
respect to a claim brought under §§ 1343(3) and 1983. Other statutory
grants and other alignments of parties and claims might call for a dif-
ferent result."79
In his dissenting opinion in Kroger, Judge Bright contended that
the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Aldinger required the district
court to dismiss Kroger's claim against Owen for lack of jurisdiction.'0
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to
be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens
or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ....
72. 427 U.S. at 4-5.
73. Id. at 19.
74. 558 F.2d at 424.
75. 427 U.S. at 4-5.
76. Id. at 18.
77. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
78. Id. at 707.
79. 427 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
80. 558 F.2d at 430 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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His argument was that Aldinger precluded a federal court from as-
serting jurisdiction over a claim if Congress had either expressly or
impliedly negated jurisdiction over the claim.81 Therefore, Judge
Bright argued, jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim between non-diverse
parties must be denied in Kroger because 28 U.S.C. § 13322 expressly
limits the parties to which diversity jurisdiction extends and has been
interpreted by the courts to require complete diversity of citizenship
between all plaintiffs and defendants.
83
Judge Bright's dissent is unpersuasive for two reasons. First,
the plaintiff in Kroger did not attempt to maintain an independent ac-
tion against the non-diverse third-party defendant under section 1332.
She did not assert that diversity jurisdiction existed; rather, she asked
the district court to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over her claim.
Section 1332 does not address matters of ancillary jurisdiction. Second,
Judge Bright's approach would force federal courts to deny jurisdic-
tion in situations in which the courts have uniformly held that juris-
diction exists. If section 1332 were held to limit diversity jurisdiction
to cases in which diversity of citizenship existed between each plain-
tiff and each defendant, including third-party defendants, no defen-
dant could implead a resident of either his or the plaintiff's state
under rule 14(a), nor could a non-diverse third-party defendant main-
tain a claim against the plaintiff. The courts have not so held.84
In summary, the decision of Aldinger v. Howard provides little
insight into the future of ancillary jurisdiction. It was dictated by
"considerations of federalism which are unlikely to play a role in
pendent party cases outside the context of a civil rights action brought
in a federal forum against a state-created entity. 85  Aldinger does
indicate that the Supreme Court sees some limits on the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction. It clearly does not decide, however, nor does its
reasoning dictate, that there must be independent jurisdictional
grounds for a plaintiff to maintain a claim against a non-diverse
third-party defendant.8
6
81. Id.at431.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
83. 558 F.2d at 431 (Bright, J., dissenting). See also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806).
84. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
85. Comment, Supreme Court Says No to Pendent Parties-At Least 7his Time, 38 U.
PiTr. L. REv. 395, 396 (1976).
86. The Court in Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15, did quote Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker
Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1976), which denied ancillary jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim
against a non-diverse third-party defendant, but only for the proposition that efficiency and
avoidance of multiplicity of suits are not the only considerations in deciding whether ancillary
jurisdiction exists.
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IV. CRITIQUE
A. Reasoning of Courts Denying Ancillary Jurisdiction
Before Kroger, every court of appeals deciding the issue refused
to allow the plaintiff to maintain a claim against the third-party defen-
dant without independent jurisdictional grounds.8 7  In order to proper-
ly evaluate the decision in Kroger, it is necessary to examine the rea-
soning given by the courts that have denied jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
claims against third-party defendants.
1. Direct/Indirect Argument
Some courts have reasoned that since the plaintiff could not sue
a non-diverse party directly, he should not be allowed to do so by an
indirect route.8 8 Professor Moore's simple answer to this is "why
not?"89 It was the defendant's choice, not the plaintiff's, to bring the
third-party defendant into federal court. In many cases the plaintiff
could not have anticipated that the third party would be impleaded,
and even if he had so anticipated, the plaintiff took the chance that
the defendant would not do so.90
2. Collusion
The courts have also contended that denying jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant prevents
the possibility of collusion between a plaintiff and a defendant in
obtaining federal jurisdiction over a party who would not otherwise be
within the court's reach.9' The court in Kroger answered this argu-
ment by stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1359,92 which provides that "[a] dis-
trict court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any
party . . . has been improperly or collusively made or joined to in-
voke the jurisdiction of such court," is adequate protection against
87. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Saalfrank v. O'Danel, 533
F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977); Rosario v. American Export-
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1977); Parker
v: W.W. Moore & Sons, 528 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co.,
512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972); McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960).
88. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 1977); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v.
Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1972); McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466, 470
(6th Cir. 1960); Palumbo v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 271 F. Supp. 361, 362 (D. Md. 1967).
89. 3 MooRE's, supra note 22, 14.27, at 14-570. A discussion of Professor Moore's
reasoning is especially appropriate in this Case Comment because the court in Kroger relied
heavily on his treatise and basically adopted his reasoning as its own. See 558 F.2d at 419
n.25.
90. See 3 MooP.a's, supra note 22, 14.27, at 14-570-71.
91. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 1977); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v.
Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1972); Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens
Bank and Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (dictum).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970).
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the specter of collusion.93  The court further stated that "[fJears of
collusion do not justify a wholesale denial of jurisdiction. 94 The pos-
sibility of collusion is a poor justification for adopting an absolute rule
concerning jurisdictional power, because if collusion is present, the
court can refuse to assert ancillary jurisdiction as a matter of discre-
tion.95
Furthermore, the possibility of collusion was reduced by the 1947
amendment to rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The earlier rule allowed the defendant to implead any party who may
have been liable to the defendant, to the plaintiff, or to both.96 Thus,
if ancillary jurisdiction were found to exist under the earlier rule, a
plaintiff could collusively circumvent the diversity requirement by su-
ing a cooperative resident of another state on a false claim, with the
understanding that the defendant would implead a third party from
plaintiff's state on the ground that the third party might be liable to
the plaintiff. Under the amended rule, because the defendant can
bring in only a party who is liable to him, the chance for collusion is
diminished. 97
3. Assumption in Allowing Jurisdiction Over the Defendant's
Claim Against the Third-Party Defendant
Several courts have asserted that the rule allowing a defendant
to bring in a third-party defendant from the plaintiff's state (thereby
destroying complete diversity) proceeds on the assumption that the
plaintiff is seeking no relief against the third-party defendant.9 8 Ac-
cording to this argument, ancillary jurisdiction exists over the third-
party plaintiff's claim because there is still diversity between the
parties to each controversy in the action, i.e., there is diversity be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant and between the third-party
plaintiff and the third-party defendant. Ancillary jurisdiction, how-
93. 558 F.2d at 423 n.25 (citing 3 MOORE'S, supra note 22, 14.27, at 14-571). See also
Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 702 (D. Kan. 1975).
94. 558 F.2d at 423 n.25 (citing 3 MOORE'S, supra note 22, 14.27, at 14-571). See also
Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 702 (D. Kan. 1975); Note, Rule 14 Clains
and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REv. 265, 275 (1971) (A "knei-jerk" denial of ancillary
jurisdiction in all cases merely because of the fear of collusion is an inadequate response to
the central jurisdictional question.).
95. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
96. See 3 MOORE'S, supra note 22, 14.01, at 14-37.
97. Professor Moore felt that the 1947 amendment to rule 14 made such a significant
reduction in the chance for collusion that in the second edition of his treatise, MOORE'S FtD-
ERAL PRACTICE, he changed his earlier position announced in the first edition, which was
written before the rule was amended, and urged that no independent jurisdiction be required
for a plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant. 3 MOORE'S, supra note 22,
14.27, at 14-565-74.
98. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 1977); Kenrose Mfg. Co, v.
Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972).
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ever, has been found to exist over a third-party plaintiff's claim when
there is no diversity between the third-party plaintiff and the third-
party defendant.99 The courts are therefore taking an inconsistent
position when they state that ancillary jurisdiction over rule 14(a)
claims is granted only because diversity will be maintained between
the parties to each claim in a case.
The Kroger court stated that the denial of ancillary jurisdiction
over claims against non-diverse third-party defendants "rests on an
overly narrow view of ancillary jurisdiction."100 The exercise of ancil-
lary jurisdiction over a defendant's claim against a third-party defen-
dant has a stronger justification than the fact that the plaintiff may
not seek relief from the third-party defendant. The defendant was
brought involuntarily into the forum, and judicial economy as well as
convenience to the litigants dictates that the defendant be able to
adjudicate all disputes connected with the plaintiff's claim against him
in one action.
4. Reduction of Litigation Based on State Law in the
Federal Courts
Another argument against the result in Kroger is that the federal
dockets are so overcrowded that the federal courts should not reach
out for litigation based upon state law. 01 Professor Moore's answer is
"that under co-operative federalism the federal courts have a higher
duty to end all court congestion, not just that of the federal courts."'0 2
The essential purposes of both ancillary jurisdiction and rule 14 are
to avoid multiplicity of suits and to determine the rights of all parties
in one action. 10 3  In light of the crowded dockets of all courts today,
it is unwise for any court to force two parties who are already before
the court to adjudicate an additional claim arising from the same set
of facts in an entirely different forum. Furthermore, if a plaintiff's
third-party claim would substantially lengthen and complicate the liti-
gation in a particular case, the court could in its discretion refuse to
retain jurisdiction' 04
Courts denying jurisdiction have also contended that the efficiency
sought so avidly by a plaintiff attempting to maintain a claim against
99. See Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959); 3 Moo 's, supra note 22, 1 14.26,
at 14-527.
100. 558 F.2d at 423 n.25 (quoting in part from 3 Mooas's, supra note 22, 14.27, at
14-571-72).
101. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 1977); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v.
Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972); Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F.
Supp. 473, 474 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
102. 3 MooRE's, supra note 22, 14-27, at 14-572.
103. See Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265, 267 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Olson
v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489, 492 (D. Neb. 1965).
104. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
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a third-party defendant in federal court would have been available
without question if the plaintiff had simply sued both the defendant
and third-party defendant in state court. 05  This argument, however,
assumes that the plaintiff anticipated that the third party would be
impleaded. Moreover, the possible availability of a more convenient
forum in state court should not bar federal jurisdiction in all cases,
but should instead be a factor for the district court to consider in
exercising its discretion.t°6
5. Rule 82
Some courts have argued that allowing ancillary jurisdiction over
a plaintiff's claim-against a non-diverse third party would violate rule
82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.107 Rule 82 states: "These
rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts . . . ."'0' The use of ancillary jurisdic-
tion to broaden the scope of an action that is already properly before
the court, however, should not be considered an extension of federal
court jurisdiction.10 9 The court already has jurisdictional power over
the parties and the disputed factual situation. Ancillary jurisdiction
would simply allow the court to hear an additional claim in an action
over which the court already has jurisdiction. Furthermore, if rule 82
does require independent jurisdiction for a plaintiff's claim against a
third-party defendant, it would also prevent a federal court from hear-
ing the other rule 14(a) claims, Le., a defendant's claim against a third-
party defendant and the latter's claim against the plaintiff. Federal
courts have, however, held that ancillary jurisdiction exists over these
rule 14(a) claims.n 0
In summary, courts denying ancillary jurisdiction over a plaintiff's
105. See Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972);
Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398, 1399 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Ayoub v. Helm's
Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473, 474 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
106. Although the plaintiff in Kroger could have originally sued all of the parties in state
court, she had no reason to do so because she was led to believe that diversity existed between
her and Owen. By the time Owen finally challenged the jurisdiction of the district court there
was some question whether the plaintiff's state remedy was still ava lable or whether it was
barred by the statute of limitations. 558 F.2d at 420. The distrit court stated that the
plaintiff's state remedy had been barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The majority of
the court of appeals declined to express an opinion on the matter because it had not been
briefed by either party. Id. at 420 n.5. The dissenting opinion of th- court of appeals, how-
ever, indicated that the remedy had not been barred, id. at 432 n.42 (Bright, J, dissenting),
and quoted IowA CoDE ANN. § 614.10 (West 1946): "If after the commencement of an action,
the plaintiff, for any cause except negligence in its prosecution, fails therein, and a new one
is brought within six months thereafter, the second shall, for the purposes herein contemplated,
be held a continuation of the first."
107. See, e.g., Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 1977).
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
109. See Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 703 (1). Kan. 1975).
110. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
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claim against a non-diverse third-party fail to give a persuasive rea-
son why a plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant is distin-
guishable from other third-party claims under rule 14(a) over which
ancillary jurisdiction is routinely granted. Moreover, none of the
courts explain why their justifications for refusing to hear a plaintiff's
claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant should not more
properly be factors for the district court to consider as a matter of
discretion. The Kroger test, as well as its predecessor in Gibbs, is a
power/ discretion test and leaves the court free to consider any factors
militating against the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over a plain-
tiff's claim against a third-party defendant.
B. The Kroger Reasoning
The court of appeals in Kroger gave two justifications for holding
that the district court had jurisdictional power over plaintiff's claim
against the third-party defendant. First, all of the parties to the con-
troversy were already before the court, and second, the claim had
common and interrelated facts with the rest of the action."' Cer-
tainly in terms of "convenience and fairness to litigants,"112 a case
meeting these requirements should be heard in one judicial proceeding.
Kroger demonstrates the optimum factual situation in which a court
should exercise its ancillary jurisdictional power. The trial was al-
most completed, and considerations of judicial economy, fairness, and
convenience to the litigants certainly dictated that the court continue
to hear the case and allow the jury to decide its outcome.1 3 Here,
instead of a collusive plaintiff trying to "do indirectly what he could
not do directly," there was an innocent plaintiff and a third-party
defendant who by "subtle and adroit pleading . . [had] gained a
substantial advantage." 1 4  If the trial went well, the third-party de-
fendant could keep the jurisdictional point hidden. If the trial went
badly or if it lost on the merits, the third-party defendant could then
assert a jurisdictional challenge.11 5
In fact, because the third-party defendant in Kroger challenged
the jurisdiction of the court late in the trial after misleading the plain-
tiff as to its place of residence, the question arises whether the reason-
ing of the Eighth Circuit would be applicable to a case in which non-
diversity between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant was
known at the time the third-party claim was made. The court's re-
fusal to accept the third-party defendant's attack on its jurisdiction
111. 558 F.2d at 424. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
112. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
113. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
114. 558 F.2d at 427.
115. Id.
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could be interpreted to be an application of the estoppel doctrine.
The Eight Circuit's reasoning, however, does not support the notion
that Kroger should be limited to its facts. The court expressly based
its holding upon Gibbs, which dealt with the jurisdictional power of the
federal courts and not with the ability of a litigant to challenge that
power." 6  The Kroger court did not hold that the third-party defen-
dant's conduct prevented it from challenging the jurisdictional power
of the district court; rather, the court stated that the third-party de-
fendant's wrongdoing estopped it from asserting that the court abused
its discretion in retaining jurisdiction. 17
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, in deciding whether to affirm
or reverse the Eighth Circuit in Kroger, must deal with the relation-
ship between claims brought under rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the contours of the cases and controversies over
which jurisdictional power is conferred upon the federal courts by ar-
ticle III of the Constitution." 8 The Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly decided the issue whether ancillary jurisdiction exists over
any of the rule 14(a) claims. That federal judiciaf power exists over
a defendant's claim against a third-party defendant without inde-
pendent jurisdictional grounds, however, is so well established in the
lower courts"19 and so desirable as a practical matter, 20 that it is un-
likely that the Supreme Court will decide that the federal courts have
never had jurisdiction over these claims. Justice Brennan in his dis-
senting opinion in Aldinger v. Howard indicated that although the
Court refused to recognize pendent-party jurisdiction on the facts of
Aldinger, the Court would not reach the "absurd result" of denying
that jurisdiction existed over a defendant's claim against a third-party
defendant.'12
If the federal courts clearly have ancillary jurisdiction over a de-
fendant's claim against a third-party defendant without independent
jurisdictional grounds, then the Court should recognize that federal
jurisdiction also exists over the other two rule 14(a) claims, i.e., the
116. See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
117. 558 F.2d at 427.
118. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
119. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414
F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969); H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1967):
Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1965); Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3rd Cir. 1962); Dery v. Wycr, 265
F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
120. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
121. See 427 U.S. at 22 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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third-party defendant's claim against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party defendant.
The court of appeals in Kroger, indicated that as a matter of
judicial power there is no distinction between the three types of claims
arising under rule 14(a). The power of a district court to hear any
of the rule 14(a) claims when both parties to it are citizens of the
same state must be derived from the close relationship between that
claim and the controversy that is already properly before the court. If
ancillary jurisdiction exists over any of the rule 14(a) claims, it must
exist over all of them.
Rule 14(a) provides that if the defendant brings a third-party de-
fendant into federal court, the plaintiff may assert any claim he has
against that third party that arises from the same transaction as the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant.1 22 In this situation, all of the
parties are already properly before the court and the additional claim
is based on the same facts as the principal claim. A federal court
acquires jurisdiction over an entire controversy that is properly before
it and should be able to resolve all disputes between the parties to
that controversy that arise from the same factual occurrence, including
a plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant.
Kathleen E. McKay,
122. Fmt. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
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